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Soft Ground Tunnel Failures in Michigan
Jerome C. Neyer
Principal, Neyer, Tiseo & Hlndo, Ltd.

SYNOPSIS
Three failures of non-reinforced concrete tunnels in Michigan have been investigated.
Descriptions of the failures have been presented, together with geotechnical data for the sites. A
probable failure mechanism has been described, as well as design concepts which need to be considered
on future projects. Finally, construction procedures to be specified as part of the design process
have been evaluated.

INTRODUCTION
During the period from 1977 through 1980, three
separate tunnel failures occurred in the suburbs
of Detroit, Michigan. All three failures occurred some time after the tunnel had been bored
and lined with concrete. Although the sites of
the individual projects are several miles apart
(See Figure 1), all are within a common geologic
setting. Since there are definite similarities
among the failures, a study has been undertaken
to establish common design and/or construction
process which might be related to the three
failures.

The geologic setting is near the terminal
moraines of the Wisconsin glaciation in this
region. Bedrock is at considerable depth,
probably in excess of 150 feet. Overlying
the shale or limestone bedrock is glacial till
or deltaic deposits associated with early
Wisconsin or late Illionoian glaciation. This
formation includes very compact fine sands,
silty sands and sandy silts. These soils are in
turn overlain
by desicated glacial lake clays
or more recent glacial outwash.
The regional groundwater level slopes downward
to the southeast. Lake St. Clair and the St.
Clair River have water surfaces in the range of
Elevation 570 to 580. The groundwater level at
the three sites being studied is in the range of
Elevation 570 to 585. Due to the presence
of the impermeable glacial lake clays above the
older till and deltaic deposits, the lower
aquifer is under artesian pressure.
I-696 TUNNEL
The design of Interstate Highway 696 in
Roseville, Michigan required a large diameter
tunnel to carry storm water from the depressed
freeway to Lake St. Clair. This tunnel was
constructed under several separate contracts in
1976 through 1978. The 2 mile stretch from
Hayes Road to Nieman Road was to be 102 inches
in diameter with the invert at approximately
Elevation 550.

1-898 TUNNEL

Soil conditions at the project location were
investigated by the drilling of test borings
along the alignment. Figure 2 gives a generalized profile of subsurface conditions in the
area where the failure eventually occurred. The
contact between the upper impermeable clays and
the lower water-bearing sands varied from several
feet above the crown of the tunnel to several
feet below the invert.
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Figure 3 presents a generalized profile of
subsurface conditions along the Romeo Arm
Interceptor. The upper clay soils are heavily
overconsolidated and the lower granular soils
are in a very compact state. The contact
between the impermeable upper soils and the
artesian aquifer varies from below the tunnel
invert to above the tunnel crown.
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During construction, dewatering wells were
installed by the contractor to lower the
artesian head in the aquifer. A wheel-type
tunnel boring machine (TBM) was used to excavate the tunnel. Circular steel ribs and timber lagging provided the primary ground support
with monolithic non-reinforced concrete used
for the secondary lining. Mining was completed
prior to commencement of concrete lining placement. No unusual problems were noted during the
construction of the tunnel.

Fig. 3.

Romeo Arm Soil Profile

The tunnel was constructed in 1972 and 1973
using a tunnel boring machine (TBM) equipped
with an hydraulically operated digger arm.
Deep well dewatering was used to lower the
groundwater level in advance of the mining
operation. Most of the tunnel was constructed
under compressed air with pressures being in
the range of 6 to 10 pounds per square inch
(psi). The primary lining was constructed of
steel ribs and timber lagging with a monolithic concrete lining placed as the mining
progressed. Although difficult mining conditions were noted, there was no evidence of
unresolved construction problems.

After a sinificant portion of the tunnel had
been mined, concreted, and accepted by the
project owner, ground settlement over the tunnel
was noted in several places. Subsequent investigation disclosed that the tunnel had
settled as much as 6 inches, had developed
cracks, and was partially filled with sand.
Three sections of tunnel, each approximately
150 to 200 feet in length were replaced by
deep open cut excavation techniques. In addition, many of the construction joints which
were formed without waterstops were grouted to
stop inflow of water and potential inflow of
soil in other areas.

In 1978, a contract to connect a local sewer to
the tunnel was awarded by the City of Fraser,
Michigan. The contractor was required to excavate a shaft to the tunnel and to connect a
drop to an eye in the existing tunnel at a dep·th
of approximately 60 feet. A limited number of
dewatering wells were installed and the excavation reportedly encountered very wet soils as it
advanced into the sand layer. It is believed
that the unbalanced hydrostatic head in the soil
resulted in upward flow of soil into the shaft
excavation. This theory is supported by the
observation that the contractor removed soil foi
several days without the shaft getting any
deeper.

The cost of this remedial action is reported
to have been approximately $10 million and
litigation between the project owner and the
contractor is continuing as of the date of
this paper.
ROMEO ARM INTERCEPTOR
During the late 1960's and the 1970's, a major
expansion of Detroit's regional sewerage coll.ection and treatment system took place.
This expansion included large diameter interceptor tunnels extending to the northerly
suburbs. One of these tunnels, the Romeo Arm
Interceptor, ran along 15 Mile Road at a depth
of approximately 55 to 70 feet.

On July 29,. 1978, the tunnel collapsed in the
immediate vicinity of the shaft. Since this
sewer served an area of more than 55 square
miles,· its collapse presented a major threat to
the environment and the health of the local
residents. An emergency by-pass of the failed
section was installed by contractors retained by
1430

the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department. As shown on Figure 4, this emergency
repair required mobilization of considerable
equipment and personnel •.

This tunnel was constructed with a wheel-type
TBM. Deep wells were drilled to lower the
groundwater level during the initial construct~on.
The dewatering was reportedly effectlve and the use of compressed air to prevent
water inflow was not necessary. Steel ribs
and timber lagging were installed for primary
support. The secondary lining of monolithicpoured non-reinforced concrete was placed
after most of the tunnelling had been
completed.
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Emergency Repair at Romeo Arm

Corridor Interceptor Soil Profile

After being put into service in July of 1972,
no problems were reported with the tunnel
until January of 1980. During a walking
inspection of the tunnel on January 27, 1980,
three separate areas of structural distress
were found in a 2,500 foot length of tunnel.
In the worst area, the tunnel had settled approximately 3 feet and the concrete secondary
lining had fallen out, exposing the steel ribs
and timber lagging. Total collapse of the
tunnel appeared to be imminent.

In order to stop inflow of soils into the ruptured tunnel, a program of dewatering and grout
injection was initiated. It was know that it
would take at least several weeks to lower
the level of the grounwater to a point below
the tunnel. Pumping of cement-based grout,
however, proved effective in halting the progressive collapse of the system within 7 days.
Dewatering wells were able to eventually lower
the groundwater level to below the tunnel.
The cost of the emergency repairs to the
collapsed interceptor was approximately $15
million. The permanent repair of this stretch
of tunnel is presently underway and is estimated to cost approximately $5 million.

The emergency procedures used to divert the
flow around the distressed areas were similar
to those used on the Romeo Arm project.
However, in order to prevent further collapse
of the tunnel during repair operations, the
soil immediately above the worst distress area
was frozen with a liquid nitrogen system .
When the flow was finally diverted from the
tunnel, the area of the worst distress
appeared as shown in Figure 6.

CORRIDOR INTERCEPTOR
The sewage flow from the Romeo Arm Interceptor
joins with flow from eastern Oakland County
and is conveyed toward the Detroit Wastewater
Treatment Plant through the Corridor Interceptor. This 12-foot 9-inch sewer was constructed during the period from 1970 through
1972. As shown on Figure 5, the generalized
soil profile for this tunnel is geologically
similar to that at the previously discussed
tunnels. However, at this location, a stratum
of compact silt was encountered between the
upper cohesive soils and the lower granular
soils.

The permanent repair of the Corridor Interceptor was accomplished by jacking a 9-foot
inside diameter reinforced concrete pipe
through the distressed areas . The annular
space between the new pipe lining and the old
concrete tunnel was filled with cement grout.
In addition , an extensive program of grouting
outside of the original tunnel was undertaken .
Repairs in this area have now been substantially completed .
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e.

After construction, the external water
pressure on the tunnel invert ranged
from 4 to 8 psi.

f.

Soil piped into the tunnel in varying
amounts depending on the location of
the strata of piping soil with respect
to open construction joints and/or
cold joints. As material piped into
the tunnel, the tunnel lost bottom
and side support.

g.

When loss of support occurred beneath
the invert, the resulting loading caused
the structure to crack circumferentially as was observed in Distressed
Area No. 3.

h.

When loss of support occurred at the
springline, the resulting nonuniform
loading caused the resistance of the
structure to be exceeded and initiated
and pattern of ovalling and longitudinal cracking and spalling observed
in all distressed areas.

Flow of groundwater into sewer tunnels has
always been considered undesirable because of
the effect of this addition water flow on
sewage treatment facilities.

Fig. 6.

However, if groundwater flows can carry even
minute amounts of soil into the tunnel, eventual collapse of the tunnel structure should
be anticipated. Such inflows of soil occur most
commonly at the tunnel invert since that is
the point of greatest external water pressure.
As soil is removed from below the tunnel, there
is a tendency for the tunnel to deflect downward at that point. This results in the tunnel
"bending" as a long beam with tension on the
bottom of the beam. In non-reinforced concrete,
this tension results in the opening of existing
cracks and the formation of new cracks. The
failure then becomes progressive with larger
cracks leading to greater soil inflow leading
to larger cracks, until collapse occurs.

Corridor Interceptor Tunnel Distress

The total cost of repairs to the Corridor
Interceptor within the areas of distress was
approximately $16 million. Additional funds
have been spent grouting leaks in the concrete
lining in other sections of the interceptor.
This procedure is being undertaken to prevent
similar failures in other areas of this critical tunnel.

FAILURE MECHANISM

In the case of the Corridor Interceptor and the
I-696 tunnels, this mechanism appears to have
been the primary cause of failure.
In the case
of the Romeo Arm Interceptor, external forces
associated with the shaft construction are
believed to have initiated the cracking. However,
it appears that once cracking started, the above
described mechanism contributed to the rapid and
progressive collapse that was observed after
the initial failure was detected.

The circumstances surrounding the collapses
of these three tunnels are somewhat different.
However, it is believed that the similar failure
mechanisms contributed to the collapse of each
of the three tunnels. A thorough investigation
of the Corridor Interceptor failure was made by
the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers. Their conclusions were as follows:
a . Seismic activity was not a factor.
b.

Concrete composition, homogeneity, and
quality were not factors and there was
no evidence of deterimental chemical
reactions .

GEOTECHNICAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

c.

At end of construction, the concrete
liner contained open construction joints
and/or cold joints at several locations.

d.

The fine to medium sands, silty sands,
and silts will pipe through openings
as narrow as 0 .0 1 in. under water
pressures less than 2 psi.

The design of any underground facility ought be
based upon adequate data regarding soil and
groundwater conditions. In the case of tunnels
below the groundwater level, it is important to
evaluate the possibility of soil being carried
into the tunnel by groundwater inflow.
During the geotechnical investigation for a
tunnel project, the design team should obtain
reliable information on the vertical and horizontal extent of aquifers encountered. Accurate
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information on piezometric levels is also considered essential, including different piezometric
levels where multiple aquifers are found.

also :ecommended that the length of pour be
restr1cted to a manageable length (not more than
120 feet between construction joints for most
tunnels).

If the geotechnical data indicates that the
tunnel will be even partially within a waterbearing formation, the grain size distribution
of the soils within that formation should be
evaluated by laboratory tests. A significant
number of tests are generally required to arrive
at a realistic range of soil properties. In
stratified soil formations, it may even be
necessary to run laboratory tests on thin portions of individual soil samples.

GEOTECHNICAL CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS

As shown on Figure 7, the soils near invert
elevation at all three tunnels were fine sands.
Studies have indicated that granular soils will
flow through an slotted opening which has a width
approximately equal to D70 of the soil. For
the soils on these sites, this relationship
would result in soil flowing through cracks as
small as 0.008 inches.
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In order for the designer of a tunnel project
to do a complete job of tunnel design, it is
obviously necessary that he or she be involved
in the project throughout construction. It is
the authors' belief that the designer, and not
the contractor, must be responsible for verifying that construction procedures are consistent with design assumptions. The contractor,
on the other hand, must be responsible for the
actual construction of the project in accordance
with the plans and specifications, as modified
by the designer during the construction process.

a HINDO , LTD.
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It is the belief of the author that tunnel
design is not completed until tunnel construction is completed. More than any other structure, a ~unnel ~ust be in harmony with its
surround1ng env1ronment (soil and groundwater)
if it is to survive. Data from test borings
and other preconstruction investigations generally gives a fair picture of what the designer
ought design for. But as the construction
proceeds, more is learned about subsurface
conditions. This new data should be checked
for compatibility with the data which formed
the basis of the design.

•

Where tunnel cracking is anticipated due to
abrupt changes in subsurface conditions, consideration should be given to installation of
additional waterstopped joints or to reinforcing these field-identified areas.
Last, but not least, tunnel designers ought
recall the words of many an instructor in Concrete Design I, "Concrete cracks!" For this
reason, it is considered imperative that an
examination be made of the completed tunnel
after all dewatering systems have been shut
down and the groundwater level has returned
to its static condition.

g

'"'

Fig. 7.
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Grain Size Distribution Curves

Cracks in non-reinforced concrete are not an
uncommon occurrence. Wherever a concrete pour
is terminated by a bulkhead, a shrinkage crack
is likely to develop. For this reason, it is
recommended that designers specify water stops
at all construction joints where soil and groundwater conditions appear likely to permit soil
inflow. waterstops should be designed to provide a total seal against water inflow at the
joint.
Shrinkage cracks can also occur in between the
construction joints. These cracks are more
+ikely to form in high strength (high cement
factor) concrete. Also, the longer the distance
between construction joints, the more likely it
is that significant shrinkage cracks will
develop. It is therefore recommended that
concrete strengths be maintained in the lower
range (3,000 to 4,000 psi) to minimize shrinkage associated with high cement factors. It is
1433

If cracks are found to be leaking water, even
clear water, the construction process is not
complete. All cracks should be sealed with
permanent grout materials. For large cracks,
cement-based grout pumped outside of the concrete lining can be effective in sealing cracks.
For smaller cracks, epoxy grouts have proven
effective.

CONCLUSIONS
It has been said that more can be learned from
one failure than from 10 successful projects.
The three failures reported in this paper
have given tunnel designers and constructors .
an opportunity to learn. The cost has be~n h1gh
- more than $40 million for the three proJects
combined. Fortunately, there was no loss of
life or serious injury associated with these
projects. If the lessons learned pr~vent f~ture
distress in tunnels in equally host1le envlronments, then perhaps it was worth it.
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